Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Parens Patriae Act: Paper Tiger or Sleeping Giant by O\u27Donnell-Gaynor, Patricia J.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1982
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Parens Patriae
Act: Paper Tiger or Sleeping Giant
Patricia J. O'Donnell-Gaynor
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cleveland
State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Note, Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Parens Patriae Act: Paper Tiger or Sleeping Giant, 31 Clev. St. L. Rev. 107 (1982)
NOTES
THE ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF 1976,
PARENS PATRIAE ACT: PAPER TIGER OR SLEEPING GIANT
I. INTRODUCTION
ODAY'S ANTITRUST LAWS GREW OUT OF the post Civil War period of
aggressive industrial expansion. Trusts, combinations and industrial
predators dominated the American marketplace with the tacit approval
of a laissez faire economic system, against the backdrop of Social Dar-
winism's "survival of the fittest"' principles. Rapid industrialization was
not to be impeded because the "invisible hand" would channel the
endeavors of big business to an ultimately beneficial social end.'
Nevertheless, as big business continued to expand and thrive in a fer-
tile economic climate, the excesses of the "robber barons" became in-
creasingly flagrant. The young society, imbued with the spirit of
democracy and a historical distrust of concentrations of power, grew
alarmed as the formerly agrarian culture became increasingly
dominated by a few large industrialists. The problem was exacerbated
by the reluctance of the legislature to act and the ineffective enforce-
ment of common law prohibitions on restraints of trade. Congress
responded to the rising tide of public discontent in 1890 when it passed
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.'
Public concern over rapid industrialization and its attendant evils was
not completely dissipated with the passage of the Sherman Act. As the
judicial branch interpreted the Sherman Act, its enforcement loopholes
became exposed and were quickly capitalized on by creative in-
As John D. Rockefeller once told a Sunday School class:
The growth of a large business is merely a survival of the fittest ....
The American Beauty Rose can be produced in the splendor and
fragrance which brings cheer to its beholder only by sacrificing the early
buds which grow up around it. This is not an evil tendency in business. It
is merely the working-out of a law of nature and a law of God.
R. HOFSTADER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 45 (Bacon 1962).
' Adam Smith introduced the "invisible-hand" doctrine in 1776 to demon-
strate that individuals will be guided to achieve the best for all in seeking their
own personal self-interest. The "invisible-hand" doctrine was used to show "that
any government interference with free competition would be harmful to society,
since such competition by itself was able to channel the selfish motives of individ-
uals so that they automatically though unintentionally, furthered the best inter-
ests of society." D. GREENWALD, THE MCGRAW-HILL DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECO-
NOMICS 314 (2d ed. 1973).
' Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976))
[hereinafter referred to as Sherman Act].
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dustrialists4 The Act eventually spawned progeny to close the loopholes
against would-be violators of the spirit, if not the letter, of antitrust
principles. Among the ensuing legislative enactments were the Clayton
Act' and the Robinson-Patman Act.' The reach of the antitrust laws,
theoretically, was to extend to every antitrust violator for every con-
ceivable type of antitrust violation.
By the mid-1970's, however, Congress realized that a gaping loophole
still remained in the antitrust laws. Almost as an afterthought to nearly
a century of vigorous governmental and private antitrust enforcement
efforts, Congress determined that the economic burden of antitrust
violations was still being borne, to a great extent, by the consumer. Fur-
thermore, the legislature recognized that existing federal antitrust laws
did not provide effective remedies for the injury inflicted upon con-
sumers.8
The 94th Congress responded to this situation by enacting the Parens
Patriae Act in 1976" to provide redress to the millions of consumers who
are frequently injured in relatively small amounts by antitrust viola-
tions but who have neither the wherewithal nor the incentive to pros-
ecute private actions.'" Congress determined that among the powerful
obstacles hampering successful consumer antitrust actions were the
restrictive class action provisions." The Parens Patriae Act was passed
' Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). Chief Justice
White's holding that restraints of trade were to be evaluated under the flexible
"rule of reason" gave rise to the concern that this standard would create a gap in
the law whereby undesirable combinations would receive judicial approval.
' Act of October 15, 1914, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27)
(an Act to supplement existing laws against unlawful restraints and monopolies
and for other purposes) [hereinafter referred to as Clayton Act].
' Act of June 19, 1936, ch. 592, 49 Stat. 1526 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a,
13b) (an Act to prohibit price discrimination) [hereinafter referred to as Robinson-
Patman Act].
7 See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977)
(vertical restrictions); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962)
(mergers); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (group
boycotts); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (tying ar-
rangements); Automatic Radio Mfg. Co., v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827
(1950) (patent monopolization); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S.
208 (1939) (horizontal collusion); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S.
392 (1927) (cartels); Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911)
(monopolization).
O See H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-8 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
HOUSE REPORT].
' The parens patriae provisions are contained in new sections 4C-4H of the
Clayton Act, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1394 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 15c-15h
(1976)) [hereinafter cited as Act or Parens Patriae Act].
, See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 6.
" FED. R. CIV. P. 23. See S. REP. No. 803, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1976) ("Con-




partially to alleviate these types of problems."
The Parens Patriae Act has been in effect for several years. Although
there has been relatively little time in which to test the full measure of
its effectiveness, it has gradually become apparent that much of the
Act's promise remains unfulfilled. Recent federal court decisions, when
coupled with the problems of funding which are being encountered by
many state attorneys general, might be endangering the Act's continu-
ing vitality and undercutting the legislature's intent in enacting the
measure. This Note will discuss some of the major issues which are
emerging under the Act and will attempt to separate the promise from
the realities of actual enforcement.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Parens Patriae Actions at Common Law
"Parens patriae" is defined as "parent of the country" and "[iln the
United States, the parens patriae function belongs with the states."'"
The concept originated in feudal England, where it was the king's "royal
prerogative" to act as a guardian for legally disabled citizens including
minors, insane and incompetent persons. 4 The "royal prerogative" and
parens patriae duties of the king became incorporated into the United
States body of law through the states.'5 As early as 1900, an expanded
parens patriae concept began to emerge whereby states were permitted
to sue, not only as guardians of "minors, insane and incompetent per-
sons,"'" but as parens patriae for all citizens."
Rules because of restrictive judicial interpretations of the notice and
manageability provisions of Rule 23.") [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
' See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 8 ("The thrust of the bill is to
[avoid] the problems of manageability which some courts have found under Rule
23.").
13 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
'" See Kintner, Griffin & Goldston, The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Im-
provements Act of 1976: An Analysis, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 18 (1977); Malina
& Blechman, Parens Patriae Suits for Treble Damages Under the Antitrust
Laws, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 193, 197 (1970).
'" Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972).
'" See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
17 In Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1 (1900), the State of Louisiana brought suit
to enjoin officials of the State of Texas from preventing Louisiana citizens, under
quarantine regulations, from sending goods into the State of Texas. Although the
Court found that relief could not be granted through the use of a parens patriae
suit, the Court recognized the general propriety of permitting parens patriae ac-
tions. Id
A series of parens patriae lawsuits followed on the heels of this decision.
These early cases established the rights of a state to prevent or repair harm to
its quasi-sovereign interest. For example, the Court in Missouri v. Illinois, 180
U.S. 208 (1901), held that the State of Missouri was permitted to sue the State of
19821
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1982
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
The concept of parens patriae emerged in antitrust litigation in the
case of Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad." The Supreme Court held
that a state as parens patriae may maintain an action for injunctive
relief when it can be shown that antitrust violations injure its
economy. 9 Recognizing the importance to antitrust law of permitting
parens patriae suits, the Court stated:
Georgia as a representative of the public is complaining of a
wrong, which if proven, limits the opportunities of her people,
shackles her industries, retards her development, and relegates
her to an inferior economic position among her sister States.
These are matters of grave public concern in which Georgia has
an interest apart from that of particular individuals who may be
affected. Georgia's interest is not remote; it is immediate."
Despite the Supreme Court's imprimatur of parens patriae actions in
antitrust enforcement,2' the device was not again utilized until 1968
when the State of Hawaii filed suit against several oil companies to
recover treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act'2 for injury
Illinois and the Chicago Sanitation District on behalf of Missouri citizens to en-
join the discharge of sewage into the Mississippi River. In Kansas v. Colorado,
206 U.S. 46 (1907), Kansas as parens patriae was entitled to restrain the diversion
of water from an interstate stream. See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206
U.S. 230 (1907) (permitting Georgia to enjoin noxious gas from a copper plant
across the border from polluting certain lands in Georgia); see also Pennsylvania
v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) (permitting Pennsylvania to sue to enjoin
restraints on the commercial flow of natural gas); North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263
U.S. 365 (1923) (holding that Minnesota could sue to enjoin drainage changes
which increased the water flow in a Minnesota stream); New York v. New Jersey,
256 U.S. 296 (1921) (holding that New York could seek to enjoin discharge of
sewage into the New York harbor).
18 324 U.S. 439 (1945). The State of Georgia, in its quasi-sovereign and pro-
prietary capacity, brought suit against twenty railroad companies seeking
damages and injunctive relief. The complaint alleged that the defendants had
conspired to restrain trade and fix prices in a manner that favored other states to
the detriment of Georgia. Id
" Id. at 447. The Court did not reach the issue of whether the antitrust laws
authorized a parens patriae action for damages. It found that Keogh v. Chicago &
N.W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922), barred recovery of damages for allegedly excessive
rates where the rates had been approved by the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion. 324 U.S. at 453.
1 324 U.S. at 451.
21 Id
- 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore in any
district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent,
without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of the suit, in-
cluding a reasonable attorney's fee.
[Vol. 31:107
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to its general economy.23 The Supreme Court refused to grant relief on
two grounds. First, the Clayton Act's requirement of injury to "business
or property" refers to "commercial interests or enterprises," and does
not encompass injury to a state's general economy." Second, to permit a
state to recover damages for injury to its general economy would
duplicate remedies otherwise available to its citizens for damage to
their business or property. 5
In California v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,2  a parens patriae action was again at-
tempted, under a different theory. The State of California sued as class
representative and parens patriae of its citizen-consumers who had suf-
fered injury as a result of twelve snack food manufacturers' alleged
price fixing conspiracy. The state sought treble damages under section
4 of the Clayton Act. 7 The Ninth Circuit held that common law prin-
ciples precluded California from maintaining a treble damage action on
behalf of its citizens as parens patriae.
The Court, however, observed that "the state is on the track of a
suitable answer (perhaps the most suitable yet proposed)" 9 and sug-
gested the need for legislative action:
[Ihf the state is to be empowered to act in the fashion here
sought we feel that authority must come not through judicial im-
provisation but by legislation and rule making, where careful
consideration can be given to the conditions and procedures that
will suffice to meet the many problems posed by one's assertion
of power to deal with another's property and to commit him to
actions taken in his behalf."
Congress accepted the Ninth Circuit's invitation to authorize parens
" Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 301 F. Supp. 982 (D. Hawaii 1969), rev'd and
remanded, 431 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 401 U.S. 936 (1971), aff'd,
405 U.S. 251 (1972). Hawaii sued in its proprietary capacity as representative of a
class of all purchasers in Hawaii and as parens patriae for damages to its general
economy incurred as a result of defendants' antitrust violations. The district
court dismissed the class action but refused to dismiss the parens patriae action,
certifying its decision for interlocutory appeal. The Ninth Circuit reversed and
directed that the parens patriae claim be dismissed. The Supreme Court affirmed
the circuit court's decision.
u 405 U.S. at 265.
Id. at 263-64. Justice Douglas expressed the position that Georgia v. Penn-
sylvania R.R. Co. authorized recovery. 324 U.S. 439 (1945) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing).
2 474 F.2d 774 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
- 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
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patriae suits by enacting Title III of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976.31
B. Summary of the Parens Patriae Act
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, parens patriae
provisions,"2 was heralded as "a new federal antitrust remedy"3 which
would permit state attorneys general to recover damages on behalf of
individual consumers who were injured by antitrust violations.' The
legislative history35 reflects a pervasive concern for the injured con-
sumer who, before the Act was passed, had no practical means of
redress. If, for example, a price fixing conspiracy results in an over:
charge of one dollar on a common consumer item and fifty million items
are sold, the conspirators have reaped approximately fifty million
dollars from their anticompetitive behavior. The individual consumer,
however, is probably unaware of the overcharge and is almost certainly
unaware of the price fixing conspiracy; he has little incentive and
meager resources with which to proceed against the conspirators even
if he were aware of the conspiracy. Typically, he no longer has receipts
or other proof of any purchases and, in any event, the individual injury
which he has sustained is monetarily insignificant vis-a-vis the enor-
mous price tag of an antitrust lawsuit. 8
This situation is illustrative of the problems which Congress intended
to resolve by enacting the Parens Patriae Act-redress for the con-
sumer as well as deterrence to the Sherman Act violator. Earlier ver-
sions of the Act attempted to overturn the result in Hawaii v. Standard
Oil Co. of California7 by permitting a state to recover damages for in-
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 15c-15h (1976). See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 8, where
the Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary stated that "[tihe thrust of
the bill is to overturn Frito-Lay by allowing State attorneys general to act as
consumer advocates in the enforcement process, while at the same time avoiding
the problems of manageability which some courts have found under Rule 23." Id.
The parens patriae provisions are contained in new sections 4C-4H of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15c-15h (1976).
See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 3.
Id. at 6-8.
See Scher, Emerging Issues Under the Antitrust Improvements Act of
1976, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 679, 680 n.6 (1977) (brief chronology of events leading to
the passage of the Act).
3 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 6. There are other societal costs of monopoly.
The Court in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., noted that "[e]very violation of
the antitrust laws is a blow to the free-enterprise system envisaged by Congress.
... This system depends on strong competition for its health and vigor, and
strong competition depends, in turn, on compliance with antitrust legislation."
405 U.S. at 262.
1 405 U.S. 251 (1972); see notes 23-25 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 31:107
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jury to its general economy." This proposal was rejected as creating the
possibility of duplicative recoveries as well as presenting serious prob-
lems for damage calculation. 9
The Act as passed permits state attorneys general to recover
damages for injury sustained by natural persons by any Sherman Act 0
violations."1 Although the Act does not specifically authorize parens
patriae actions for injunctive relief, it is well-established that such ac-
tions are maintainable. 2
The Act excludes from the monetary award any damages which could
be duplicated in other actions,43 including damages properly allocable to
business entities and specifically excludes business entities from the
purview of the Act." When the state prevails, it is entitled to court-
awarded costs, including reasonable attorney's fees in addition to treble
damages.'" A 1980 amendment to the Act added provisions which permit
" At various times, both the House and Senate versions contained such a pro-
vision. However, the Antitrust Subcommittee deleted the provision from the
original Senate Bill and, although such a provision was not in the original House
legislation, it was added by the Monopolies Subcommittee, which later deleted it.
See S. 1284, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4C(a)(2) (1975); H.R. 38, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 4C(a)(2) (1975).
See The Antitrust Improvements Act of 1975: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary Comm. on S. 1284, (pt.
1), 94th Cong., lst & 2d Sess. 133-34 (1975-76) (statement of Walker B. Comegys)
[hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]; Hearings on H.R. 38 & H.R. 2850 Before
the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 92-93 (1975) (statement of William Jentes)
[hereinafter cited as House Hearings]. This deletion was apparently unnoticed by
the dissenters to Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), who observed
that Title III "overruled the holding of Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co ....... Id. at
756 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
' Id. § 15c(a)(1). The Parens Patriae Act is an addition to the Clayton Act,
which permits the award of treble damages to persons injured by anything for-
bidden in the antitrust laws. Enforcement of the Act, however, is limited to in-
juries sustained by reason of a Sherman Act violation.
" See Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945). The legislative
history clearly indicates that Pennsylvania R.R. Co. is still good law. See 122
CONG. REC. S15,417-18 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Hart); id. at
H10,295-96 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Rodino); see HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 8.
15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(1) (1976).
" Id § 15c(a)(1)(B)(ii); see also id. § 15g(3). A small business exemption was
proposed but rejected. See 122 CONG. REC. H2,085 (daily ed. March 18, 1976). See
also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 9.
"5 15 U.S.C. § 15(a)(2) (1976), amended by 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
Private attorneys employed by the state are within the statutory definition of
"state attorney general," so long as they are not employed on a contingency fee
arrangement, unless the court determines the amount of the reasonable attorney
fee pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 15c(d)(1) (1976).
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the state to recover an award of prejudgment interest where certain
specified considerations are found by the court. 6
As a means of facilitating the procedural aspects of the suit, the Act
provides for notice to state residents by publication.' 7 If the court finds
that such notice would "deny due process of law to any person or per-
sons," it may, in its discretion, direct that additional notice be given.'8 A
person on whose behalf the action is brought may exclude his claim by
filing appropriate notice with the court in a timely manner.'9 The in-
dividual is then free to institute a private antitrust action. If the person
fails for any reason to notify the court of his election to "opt out,"
however, the final judgment in the parens patriae action will be res
judicata against his individual claim.0
Court approval is required before a suit may be dismissed or settled. 1
This provision operates to safeguard consumers. In addition, if the court
finds that the state attorney general has acted "in bad faith, vexa-
tiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons," it may award a reasonable
attorney's fee to the prevailing defendant."
Where the court determines that a defendant has fixed prices in viola-
tion of the Sherman Act, damages may be proved and assessed in the
aggregate by means of: 1) statistical sampling methods; 2) the computa-
tion of illegal overcharges; or 3) such other means of aggregating
damages as the court may, in its discretion, require.53 There is no need
to prove separately individual claims or amounts of damage to the per-
sons on whose behalf the suit is brought."' This provision is critical in
view of the large number of potential claimants on whose behalf a
typical parens patriae action is brought.
Damages may be distributed in such a manner as the district court
deems advisable, or labeled as a "civil penalty" by the court and
deposited as revenues with the state.5 In either case the distribution
procedure must afford each person an opportunity to recover his por-
tion of the net monetary relief."
46 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(2), amended by 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
" 15 U.S.C. § 15c(b)(1) (1976). See SENATE REPORT, supra note 11, at 46; HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 8, at 11-12.
Notice by publication was a provision in the original Senate bill. Although the
original House version did not contain such a provision, the House Monopolies
Subcommittee later inserted it.
'" 15 U.S.C. § 15c(b)(1) (1976).
" Id. § 15c(b)(2).
5' Id. § 15c(b)(3).
", Id. § 15c(c).
5 Id. § 15c(d)(2).
- Id. § 15d.
54 Id
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The Act further provides that whenever an attorney general of the
United States brings an antitrust action which he believes would be main-
tainable by a state attorney general under this Act, he shall promptly
notify the state attorney general in writing. 7 In addition, the attorney
general of the United States, upon the request of a state attorney
general, shall make available as permitted by law any investigative files
or other material pertinent to an actual or potential parens patriae
action.'
III. ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS
The Act has been in effect for several years. 9 However, despite the
fanfare that greeted its passage,"0 discrepancies between the
legislature's intent and the mechanics of actual enforcement have
emerged. The remainder of this Note will highlight some of the actual
and potential obstacles which must be overcome before the Act's full en-
forcement potential can be realized.
A. Suits on Behalf of Indirect Purchasers
The Parens Patriae Act creates a cause of action for injury sustained
by natural persons by reason of any violation of the Sherman Act. 1 The
touchstone of violation of the Parens Patriae Act is a contract, combina-
tion or conspiracy in restraint of trade62 and/or monopolization or an at-
tempt to monopolize interstate trade or commerce."3 The most logical
application of the Act is against price fixing violations at the manufac-
turer or distributor levels on behalf of consumers who must pay higher
prices for their goods as a result of the defendants' anticompetitive con-
duct.
Consumers rarely purchase goods directly from the manufacturer or
distributor; it is far more likely that they will purchase directly from a
" Id. § 15f(a).
SIdA. § 15f(b). This section of the Act has given rise to the issue of whether
grand jury materials constitute "any investigative files or other materials" which
are to be made available to state attorneys general. For an excellent discussion
of this issue, see Maximov, Access by State Attorneys General to Federal Grand
Jury Antitrust Investigative Materials, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 821 (1981).
The Act was approved September 30, 1976.
o The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976). The entire Act, including Title III-Parens Patriae,
was billed as "the most far reaching expansion in the nature of antitrust enforce-
ment since the Clayton Act of 1914." Senate Hearings, supra note 39 (pt. 3) (state-
ment of Frederick M. Rowe). See also [July-Dec.] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) No. 780 at A-1 (Nov. 8, 1976) (statement of Rep. Peter W. Rodino, Jr.,
chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary).
"1 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a) (1976).
62 Id. § 1.
Id. § 2.
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retailer or wholesaler.U Typically, the finished product may pass
through the hands of several middlemen, i.e., distributors, wholesalers
or retailers, before it reaches the consumer . 5 On the other hand, the
product may be a component part of another good which itself passes
through several intermediaries before it reaches the consumer as part
of the final product. Alternately, the product may be a machine which
is sold to a manufacturer for use in producing consumer goods which
are, in turn, passed through various middlemen to the consumer. 7
Illegal price fixing may be perpetrated by any one of the actors in any
level of the chain of distribution. The profit-oriented economic system of
the United States dictates that each actor, in order to maximize profits,
pass on its costs to the next member of the chain. It is clear that the
ultimate economic burden is largely borne by the final participant in the
chain: the purchaser-consumer who must pay higher prices for his goods
and services. 8 Unless the price fixing occurred at the retail level, the
consumer is almost always an indirect purchaser of the overpriced
goods.
In Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 9 the Supreme
Court was petitioned to decide whether a direct purchaser seeking treble
damages against his supplier who allegedly fixed prices was entitled to
recover for the full overcharge, where defendant offered to show that
the plaintiff-purchaser "passed on" the higher costs to his own
customers. The Court rejected defendant's "pass-on" defense on two
grounds:"0 1) the Court was unwilling to complicate treble damage ac-
See, e.g., HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 6.
See, e.g., California v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d 774 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 908 (1973) (suit by state on behalf of citizens against twelve manufac-
turers of snack foods charging conspiracy to fix and maintain prices in violation
of the Sherman Act); Donson Stores, Inc. v. American Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 481
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (motion to intervene by putative class of twenty million con-
sumers of bread in treble damage action against bread manufacturers).
" See, e.g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, reh'g denied, 434 U.S.
881 (1977) (price fixing alleged against concrete block manufacturers, which sell
to masonry contractors, which in turn sell to general contractors, from which
consumer-respondents purchase the block as incorporated in masonry
structures); Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (plaintiff-homeowners sued manufacturers of
plumbing fixtures for overcharges allegedly passed on to them when they pur-
chased homes from builders or prior homeowners).
87 See, e.g., Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481
(1968) (treble damage action brought by shoe manufacturer against manufacturer
of shoe machinery; defendant sought to show that shoe manufacturer had not
been injured because it passed on illegal overcharge to those who bought shoes
from it).
" See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 3.
392 U.S. 481 (1968).




tions with the economic uncertainties and complexities involved in prov-
ing "pass-on";7' and 2) unless a direct purchaser was entitled to recover
the full overcharge, antitrust violators would "retain the fruits of their
illegality" because indirect purchasers "would have only a tiny stake in
the lawsuit," and therefore little incentive to sue."2 The practical result
of this decision is a windfall to the direct purchaser who can pass on the
overcharge to his own purchasers, as well as recover the full amount of
the illegal overcharge from the antitrust violators.
After Hanover Shoe, controversy developed among courts and com-
mentators as to whether the Court's rejection of "defensive" pass-on
also barred its "offensive" use by plaintiffs." The offensive use of pass-on
was first presented to the Supreme Court in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois."
In that case, plaintiffs were indirect purchasers who alleged that con-
crete block manufacturers had engaged in a price fixing conspiracy,
whereby the illegal overcharge was fixed by defendant manufacturers
and then passed on through two separate levels in the chain of distribu-
tion, ie., through masonry contractors and general contractors, before
reaching plaintiffs. Plaintiffs argued that inasmuch as the prices which
they paid for concrete block were more than three million dollars higher
by reason of the price fixing conspiracy, they were injured in their
"business or property." The Court ruled that because Hanover Shoe
bars a defendant from asserting a pass-on theory as a defense to price
fixing in a treble damage action, indirect purchasers may not use a pass-
on theory offensively to recover damages from the alleged price fixer.
The Court reached this holding through a two-step reasoning process:
where "an overcharged buyer has a pre-existing 'cost-plus' contract, thus making
it easy to prove that he has not been damaged . Id. at 494.
Id. at 492-93.
2 Id. at 494.
, Some commentators and courts construed Hanover Shoe as barring the of-
fensive use of pass-on, on the ground that the injury was too remote, or that
plaintiffs lacked privity with the defendant. See, e.g., Bill Minielli Cement Con-
tracting, Inc. v. Richter Concrete Corp., 62 F.R.D. 381 (S.D. Ohio 1973);
Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 50
F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd sub nom., Mangano v. American Radiator &
Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d. 1187 (3d Cir. 1971) (per curiam). See also Donson Stores,
Inc. v. American Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); United Egg Pro-
ducers v. Bauer Int'l Corp., 312 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
Other courts disagreed, reasoning that Hanover Shoe should be limited to
defensive pass-on, that the offensive use of pass-on would further the antitrust
goal of deterrence by preventing windfall recoveries by uninjured middlemen,
and that an injured indirect purchaser who could show causation or "fact of
damage" should be permitted to recover. See, e.g., Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co.,
536 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S.
720 (1977); In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); Illinois v. Bristol-Myers Co., 470 F.2d 1276 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (per curiam).
1' 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
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Any rule which was to be adopted must apply equally to plaintiffs and
defendants alike, and the Court declined to abandon its holding in
Hanover Shoe that the party injured in his "business or property" is the
direct puchaser."
It is noteworthy that the Illinois Brick decision was rendered approx-
imately nine months after the Act was passed. The subsequent claims of
indirect purchasers who brought actions as parens plaintiffs have been
dismissed by courts on the basis of this decision." Yet Illinois Brick
neither arose nor was decided under the Parens Patriae Act. Instead, it
was a private class action instituted under section 4 of the Clayton Act.
In fact, the only reference to the parens patriae provisions of the recently
enacted Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act appears in two
footnotes." Moreover, at least one of the Court's reasons for barring in-
direct purchaser actions is inapplicable to parens patriae actions. The
Court declined to overrule Hanover Shoe, which held that the party in-
jured in his "business or property" under section 4 of the Clayton Act is
the direct purchaser. The Hanover Shoe Court justified this holding by
reasoning that, inter alia, unless direct purchasers were permitted to
sue for that portion of the overcharge which they had passed on to in-
direct purchasers, then antitrust violators would retain the fruits of
their unlawful acts because indirect purchasers would have too small a
stake in the potential recovery to bring suit." That reason was
presumably viable in the economic and legal climate which prevailed at
the time the Hanover Shoe decision was rendered, but one of the
specific reasons for the passage of the Parens Patriae Act was to pre-
vent that kind of result. Congress, in passing the Act, intended to pro-
tect the individual consumer who typically sustains only minor injuries
to his business or property as a result of antitrust violations." Never-
theless, when the aggregate amount of relatively insignificant individual
injuries is tabulated, a state attorney general has sufficient incentive to
Id. at 728-29.
70 See generally In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1287 (D. Md.
1981); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust
Litig., 497 F. Supp. 218 (C.D. Cal. 1980). See notes 101-19 infra and accompanying
text.
" The majority refers to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act
in two footnotes. See 431 U.S. 720, 773 n.14; id at 747 n.31. Although the Court
recognizes that Congress could amend section 4 to permit actions by indirect pur-
chasers, it does not reach the issue of whether the Act is such an amendment. Id
at 733 n.14.
The dissenters argued that the Act was expressly intended to provide a
remedy for injured consumers whether or not they purchased directly from the
violator. Id at 756-58.
7 See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494
(1968).
1 See notes 33-36 supra and accompanying text.
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bring suit against the antitrust violator on behalf of the injured con-
sumers." To permit Illinois Brick to bar the state attorney general from
bringing a parens patriae action on behalf of injured consumers who are
indirect purchasers is to frustrate one of the primary purposes for
which the Act was passed.'
The Illinois Brick Court's remaining ground for justifying its holding
can be easily dispensed with for purposes of private treble damage ac-
tions as well as parens patriae actions. The Court expressed the need
for symmetrical application of pass-on to defendants and plaintiffs alike.
However, the interests at stake in permitting the defensive use of pass-
on are simply inappropriate to the use of offensive pass-on. As Justice
Brennan's dissent correctly points out," the defensive use of pass-on
would permit the antitrust violator to retain a portion of his ill-gotten
overcharges. This result is inconsistent with the importance of treble
damage actions in deterring antitrust violations.83 The offensive use of
pass-on, on the other hand, would both further the purposes of the anti-
trust laws and recompense the injured party.84 The need for symmetry
is particularly difficult to justify with respect to parens patriae actions
in light of the general objectives of the antitrust laws and the specific
" The dissent to Illinois Brick recognized this legislative purpose when it
stated:
Indeed, Congress acted on the premise that § 4 gave a cause of action to
indirect as well as direct purchasers when it recently enacted the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 . . . and authorized
state attorneys general to sue as parens patriae to recover damages on
behalf of citizens of their various States.
Illinois Brick v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 749 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81 For example, the Senate Report states:
A direct cause of action is granted the States to avoid the inequities and
inconsistencies of restrictive judicial interpretations .... Section 4C is
intended to assure that consumers are not precluded from the opportun-
ity of proving the amount of their damage and to avoid problems with
respect to manageability [of class actions], standing, privity, target area,
remoteness, and the like.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 11, at 42.
Representative Rodino, a sponsor, stated:
[Aissuming the State attorney general proves a violation, and proves an
overcharge was "passed on" to the consumers, injuring them "in their
property"; that is, their pocketbooks-recoveries are authorized by the
compromise bill whether or not the consumers purchased directly from
the price fixer, or indirectly, from intermediaries, retailers, or other
middlemen.
122 CONG. REC. H10,295 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1976) (emphasis added). See also
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 44.
Congress rejected earlier lower court decisions which erected standing bar-
riers to indirect purchasers. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 11, at 42-43.
82 431 U.S. at 753-54.
8' Id. at 752-53.
4 Id.
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goal of permitting a state to recover the amount of illegal overcharges
on behalf of its indirect purchaser-citizens.
Beyond its refusal to overrule Hanover Shoe and its perceived need
for symmetry, the Illinois Brick majority expressed the additional con-
cern that the offensive use of pass-on might create a serious risk of
multiple defendant liability. The Court observed that even though an in-
direct purchaser had recovered, a direct purchaser could still auto-
matically recover the full amount of the overcharge that the indirect
purchaser had shown to be passed on.8" This concern is groundless in the
framework of a parens patriae action, however, because the Act itself
contains a procedural check against duplicative remedies by excluding
from the recovery any amount which duplicates damages awarded for
the same injury or which is properly allocable to any business entity.86
Thus, where a direct purchaser has been recompensed for an antitrust
injury, a parens patriae indirect purchaser can recover only to the ex-
tent that the direct purchaser has not done so. Moreover, the indirect
purchasers are precluded from recovering any damages which are prop-
erly allocable to any business entity.
The use of existing procedural mechanisms would further reduce the
remaining dangers of duplicative recovery. For example, safeguards
such as statutory interpleader, compulsory joinder and the doctrines of
res judicata and collateral estoppel could be incorporated into parens
patriae adjudications to eliminate the risk of double recoveries. 7 Justice
Id. at 730.
15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(1)(A), (B) (1976).
87 Congress debated the issue of duplicative recovery in connection with the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. The Senate Report paid short shrift to the issue. Quoting
from the Ninth Circuit in In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom., Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 919
(1974), the Report stated:
We therefore see no problem of double recovery, and we believe that
if this difficulty should arise in some other connection, the district court
will be able to fashion relief accordingly. In addition to the court's con-
trol over its decree, numerous devices exist. We note that the consolida-
tion of cases, which has already occurred, is one means of averting
duplicitous awards. The short, four-year statute of limitations is another;
later suits, after final judgment herein, are unlikely. 15 U.S.C. § 15b. In
other cases, it may be that statutory interpleader, 28 U.S.C. § 1335,
could be used by antitrust defendants to avoid double liability. If
necessary, special masters may be appointed to handle complex cases.
Finally, there are the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel
and procedures for compulsory joinder. The day is long past when
courts, particularly federal courts, will deny relief to a deserving plain-
tiff merely because of procedural difficulties or problems of apportioning
damages.
We would prefer to place the burden of proving apportionment upon
appellees, rather than deny all recovery to appellants. Such a burden
would be the consequence of appellees' illegal acts, not appellants' suits.
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Brennan's dissenting opinion dismissed the majority's fears, reasoning
that: 1) procedural mechanisms will substantially eliminate the risk of
duplicative recovery, and 2) even if these mechanisms are not completely
effective, the danger of multiple liability as to a few defendants does not
justify barring all indirect purchasers from recovery."
The questionable status of parens patriae after Illinois Brick is par-
tially dependent upon whether the Act creates new substantive rights
or is merely a new procedural device. Theoretically, if the Act created
new substantive rights apart from the Clayton Act, cases arising under
it could be distinguished so as not to fall within the Illinois Brick rule,
which arose in a Clayton Act suit. The Illinois Brick majority noted,
however, that the Act "simply created a new procedural device -parens
patriae actions by states on behalf of their citizens-to enforce existing
rights of recovery under § 4."9 While the version originally passed by
the House authorized parens patriae suits "under § 4,"90 the Senate ver-
sion made no reference to section 4. This omission could be construed as
indicating the creation of a new cause of action." Representative
Flowers, a member of the House Judiciary Committee who was instru-
mental in shaping the Act, noted during final debate that the Act does
not create a new cause of action; 2 the enacted version, however, retains
the Senate language. Further, Senator Hart93 and Representative Ro-
dino,9 4 two of the Act's original sponsors, stated that a new cause of ac-
tion was being created.
The impact of Illinois Brick on parens patriae is not yet known and is
largely dependent on future judicial interpretation. 5 Because the Act
Where the choice is between a windfall to intermediaries or letting guilty
defendants go free, liability is imposed. Hanover Shoe, supra, 392 U.S. at
494. So, too, between ultimate purchasers and defendants.
S. REP. No. 94-803, p.44 (1976) (quoting 487 F.2d at 201) (citation omitted).
431 U.S. at 761-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
89 Id. at 734 n.14.
90 See H.R. 8532, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
"' H.R. 8532 was passed by the Senate June 10, 1976. Because it made no
reference to § 4 and its standing requirements, it is arguable that parens patriae
is a new substantive right.
122 CONG. REC. H10,300 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1976).
Id. at S15,324 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1976); id. at S15,417 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1976).
Id. at H10,294 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1976).
95 Following the Illinois Brick decision, Congress introduced bills designed to
permit treble damages under § 4 to indirect purchasers. See S. 300, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 11942, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); S. 1874, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977); H.R. 8359, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). Moreover, the District of Co-
lumbia has enacted a local bill which contains an Illinois Brick repealer. In addi-
tion to prohibiting contracts, combinations and conspiracies to restrain trade, as
well as monopolies and attempts to monopolize trade or commerce, the bill allows
the assertion of a pass-on defense and permits courts to apportion damages so as
to avoid duplicative recoveries. Uniform Schedule of Rate Ceilings, [July-Dec.]
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was passed so recently, few parens patriae cases have arisen under
which an Illinois Brick issue has been presented. One such case is Ver-
mont v. Densmore Brick Co.," in which the state, as parens patriae,
brought a damage action for price fixing on behalf of a class of all Ver-
mont residents who purchased a certain brand of woodburning stove
from defendant's retailers. The state alleged, inter alia, that defendant
artificially fixed the prices at which the stoves were advertised and of-
fered at retail sale and coerced its Vermont retailers to advertise and
sell the stoves at its established or suggested resale prices. Defendant
moved for partial summary judgment on the grounds that Illinois Brick
precluded recovery by indirect purchasers. The court construed the Il-
linois Brick restriction as applicable "where a plaintiff suing to terminate
a price-fixing conspiracy is removed from the conspiracy by one or more
stages of distribution. 9 7 Because the state, as plaintiff, alleged that the
retailers were co-conspirators in this price fixing scheme, the court
declined to grant defendant's motion. 8 This court would seem to give
the Illinois Brick holding full effect in parens patriae actions.
The California court took a somewhat different approach in In re
Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust
Litigation.9 In this multidistrict litigation, each state suing as parens
patriae sought recovery from many producers and distributors of crude
oil and refined petroleum products on behalf of indirect purchasers.
Their theory of recovery was principally based upon increases in the
retail prices of gasoline resulting from defendants' alleged antitrust
violations. The defendants challenged these suits on grounds that such
suits by state attorneys general under the federal antitrust laws were
unconstitutional. Specifically, defendants argued that the alleged acts of
wrongdoing were so remote from the actual retail prices that any at-
tempt to establish a causal relationship would not only be futile, but
would also deny them due process. In response, the court stated that
[in order to recover, the plaintiffs will have to prove the anti-
trust violations upon which they rely and they will have to trace
the injurious effects of such violations upon the individual con-
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 992, at D-10 (Dec. 4, 1980).
At the state level, five states-California, Hawaii, Illinois, New Mexico and
Wisconsin-have amended their antitrust laws to permit indirect purchasers to
sue. This liability to antitrust violators is in addition to their liability to direct
purchasers for treble damages under the Clayton Act. See CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 16750(a) (West Supp. 1980); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 480-14(c) (Supp. 1980);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 60-7(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
57-1-3(A) (Supp. 1980); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 133.18(1) (West Supp. 1980).
1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,347, at 75,775 (D. Vt. 1980).
SId at 75,778.
' Id This refusal to dismiss was based on the co-conspirator exception to Illi-
nois Brick. See notes 101-19 infra and accompanying text.
" 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,839, at 73,495 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
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sumers or other members of a plaintiff class. And, of course, this
task is believed to be compounded (and perhaps seriously im-
paired) by the decision of the Supreme Court in Illinois Brick Co.
v. Illinois .... which precludes recovery on behalf on any con-
sumer that bought from a vendor that otherwise would have had
his own right of action for the antitrust violation concerned.
Such proofs will have to be made in full accord with the prin-
ciples of due process.'00
The court did not ignore the possible impact of Illinois Brick, but by
declining to rule out the offensive use of pass-on, the court at least dis-
counted the effects of Illinois Brick's indirect purchaser rule on parens
patriae and focused instead on the evidentiary difficulties of tracing in-
jurious effects from the producer-distributor level to the retailer level,
regardless of plaintiffs' status as direct or indirect purchasers. The
defendants then moved to dismiss the indirect purchaser claims in
reliance on Illinois Brick."'1 At the outset, the court noted three excep-
tions to the indirect purchaser bar which it derived from the Illinois
Brick opinion. First, where plaintiffs pay the illegal overcharge directly
to defendant's co-conspirators, plaintiffs can still recover on the ground
that the "conspirators are mutual agents and each is liable for the acts
of the other. Illinois Brick does not alter the rule since no pass-on of
overcharges is involved."'0 ° Second, consistent with Illinois Brick, plain-
tiffs can recover for indirect purchases under "pre-existing, fixed-
quantity, cost-plus contracts with the direct purchaser."'0 3 Third, plain-
tiffs will be permitted to recover for overcharges passed on by entities
which are owned or controlled by defendants. 4 The court was unwilling
to expand these exceptions, and accordingly held that indirect pur-
chasers would be permitted to prosecute their claims only if they fit
o Id. at 73,497 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). As a preliminary sugges-
tion, the court proposed that plaintiffs chart the course by which they believe
they can establish the proof that will connect violation to recoverable damage.
"' In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust
Litig., 497 F. Supp. 218 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
10' Id. at 226. See also Fontana Aviation, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 617 F.2d
478 (7th Cir. 1980).
103 497 F. Supp. at 226. Such a fixed cost contract would obviate the intricacies
of tracing the effect and amount of an overcharge on the purchaser's prices,
costs, sales and profits. See also Jewish Hosp. Assoc. of Louisville, Ky. v.
Stewart Mechanical Enter., 628 F.2d 971 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966
(1981).
10 497 F. Supp. at 226. The source of this theory is the now notorious footnote
16 of the Illinois Brick decision, in which the Court noted that "[a]nother situation
in which market forces have been superseded and the pass-on defense might be
permitted is where the direct purchaser is owned or controlled by its customer."
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 n.16 (1976). See also Royal Printing
Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 621 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1980).
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within one of the Illinois Brick exceptions.' 5 Despite the California
court's early willingness to give plaintiffs an opportunity to trace their
injuries through the chain of distribution,'" it ultimately chose to
adhere to the Illinois Brick holding and its specified exceptions, giving
no indication that the parens patriae character of the action entitled
plaintiffs to special considerations under Illinois Brick.
In a more recent parens patriae case, In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Anti-
trust Litigation,'7 state attorneys general brought a parens patriae ac-
tion on behalf of automobile purchasers, who also sued as individuals,
against the Toyota automobile distributor and its dealers. The parens
plaintiffs alleged a voluntary price fixing conspiracy between the
Toyota distributor and its various dealers, in which the defendants fixed
the retail price of Toyotas in order to recover unlawful overcharges
from the automobile purchasers. The defendant distributor moved to
dismiss on the grounds that plaintiffs, as its indirect purchasers, were
barred from recovering under Illinois Brick. The court held that plain-
tiffs would be allowed to sue the distributor as well as dealers under the
co-conspirator exception to Illinois Brick."' With respect to the risk of
duplicative liability, the court held that the defendant dealers would be
precluded from suing their distributor under the doctrine of in pari
delicto."'
Like the court in In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in
Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation,"' the Mid-Atlantic court
chose not to distinguish the Clayton Act private plaintiffs in Illinois
Brick from the parens patriae plaintiffs in Mid-Atlantic. Moreover,
although the Mid-Atlantic court declined to dismiss the indirect pur-
chasers' parens patriae claims as such, the claims were not dismissed on
the basis of the already recognized co-conspirator exception.
In addition to the co-conspirator exception on which it relied, the
court also recognized the "cost plus" contract and "ownership or con-
trol" exceptions."' However, the Mid-Atlantic court went a step further
497 F. Supp. at 227.
106 See note 100 supra and accompanying text.
"o 516 F. Supp. 1287 (D. Md. 1981).
"' Id. at 1295. The court observed that some courts have justified the co-
conspirator exception on the ground that the ultimate consumer, such as plain-
tiffs, is a direct rather than indirect purchaser. It noted that still other courts
have concluded that in a situation such as that presented in Mid-Atlantic Toyota,
there is no passed-through overcharge. Id.
'0 Id. at 1295-96. The in pari delicto doctrine can be summarized as follows:
"[A] party, who voluntarily formulates and equally participates in a non-coercive
agreement for reciprocal dealing ... ,cannot maintain an action under § 1 of the
Sherman Act against its trading partner." Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster
Co., 451 F.2d 3, 16 (4th Cir. 1971).
"' 497 F. Supp. 218 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
"' 516 F. Supp. at 1292.
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in expanding the parameters of the indirect purchaser exceptions. It
first noted that tracing problems was the primary policy consideration
underlying the Illinois Brick rule. It then observed that the Illinois
Brick Court characterized the "ownership or control" exception as an ex-
ample of a situation in which "market forces have been superseded . . .. ""I
The court in Mid-Atlantic conceded that other situations in which market
forces are superseded could similarly fall outside the Illinois Brick ration-
ale. Where market forces have been superseded, the court reasoned, trac-
ing problems disappear and where tracing problems are nonexistent, so
likewise is the rationale underlying Illinois Brick The court concluded
that "when the reasons for the rule do not apply, application of the rule
would be plainly inappropriate."'1 3 The court believed that since the
Supreme Court could not possibly have listed every circumstance where
an exception might be warranted, it listed some exceptions only to guide
lower courts in determining the types of situations in which application of
the rule would not be required."' This court refused to apply the Illinois
Brick rule woodenly where plaintiffs are indirect purchasers; instead, it
not only acknowledged the three well-recognized narrow exceptions, but
also considered as an exceptional situation one in which the market forces
have been superseded. Unfortunately, the court provided no guidance as
to what factors must be shown before such a situation will be found to exist.
It is conceivable that the court would consider as such a factor a cir-
cumstance where, as in Mid-Atlantic, defendants would not face a risk of
duplicative recoveries. The court noted that inasmuch as the doctrine of
in pari delicto barred defendant dealers from recovery against defendant
distributor, the risk of duplicative recovery was negligible. The court con-
sidered this to be a significant "policy factor [which] militates against
dismissal of the parens suits as well.""' Although the court does not
specifically recognize this circumstance as evidence that the market
forces have been superseded, which would require suspension of Illinois
Brick, it does indicate that negligible risk of multiple recovery is an im-
portant policy consideration which might be used to justify an exception
to Illinois Brick. In any event, following Mid-Atlantic, a state attorney
general would be well-advised to allege suspension of market forces and,
if possible, minimal risk of double recovery.
The impact that Illinois Brick will have on future parens patriae ac-
tions is still unknown. Some tentative conclusions can be drawn, however,
"' 431 U.S. at 736 n.16. It should be noted that the Court in footnote 16 sug-
gested the "suspension of market forces" exceptions in the context of defensive
pass-on. Id Its policy of symmetry would presumably make these exceptions, if
they are found to exist, equally applicable to the offensive use of pass-on.
"' 516 F. Supp. at 1293.
.. Id at 1293 n.14.
"' Id at 1296.
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from those few parens patriae cases1 ' in which the courts have faced an
indirect purchaser situation: 1) Parens patriae claims will not be afforded
any different treatment under Illinois Brick than are private antitrust ac-
tions; 2) courts will recognize the narrow "cost plus" contracts, "owner-
ship and control" and "co-conspirator" exceptions to the rule; 3) at least
one court117 will recognize additional exceptions in situations where
market forces have been suspended because tracing problems are no
longer present; and 4) the fact that the risk of double recovery does not
exist militates against dismissal of parens patriae indirect purchaser ac-
tions.
If Illinois Brick is made fully applicable to parens patriae suits, the Act
will be eviscerated."8 It does not seem proper that courts should afford Il-
linois Brick so broad an interpretation within the context of parens
patriae actions.
B. Bypassing Obstacles to Class Actions
The maintenance of consumer class actions under the antitrust laws
has been particularly troublesome as a result of three requirements of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3): 1) the requirement that ques-
tions of law or fact common to all class members predominate over in-
dividual questions; 2) the requirement that a class action be superior to
other available methods of adjudication, with special emphasis on
"manageability"; and 3) the requirement that members of the class
receive individual notice to the extent practicable."9 The stringency of
these requirements and the particular difficulties which they have
presented to consumer class actions caused the 94th Congress to con-
clude that the class action is not a viable technique for consumer
damage recovery under the antitrust laws.'20
16 See also In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1287 (D. Md. 1981); In
re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 497 F.
Supp. 218 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
117 See In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1287 (D. Md. 1981).
118 As one state attorney general has said:
[Tihe intended utilization of the protection afforded consumers under
Section 4C will not fully be realized until the decision in Illinois Brick is
overruled by future judicial or congressional action, or a judicial deter-
mination is made that parens patriae actions are not subject to the in-
direct purchaser holding established in Illinois Brick.
Browning, Jr., Parens Patriae Actions: An Assessment, 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 1015,
1019 (1980).
"1 Other aspects of maintaining consumer class actions under antitrust laws
which have not proven to be especially problematic are the requirements that in-
dividual actions would result in varying adjudications, that the class can be so
numerous as to make joinder impracticable, that representative parties can fairly
and adequately represent the interest of the class, and that the claims or
defenses of the representative parties can be typical of the class. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
12' See SENATE REPORT, supra note 11, at 39 ("consumers have found little
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1. Requirement of Common Questions of Law or Fact
Section 4 of the Clayton Act requires proof that damages, in fact,
were incurred ("fact of damage") before the plaintiff must prove the
precise amount of damages 2 ' After meeting this threshold requirement,
plaintiff must bear the further burden of proving the amount of dam-
ages sustained.122 As a result of these individualized proof requirements,
class actions have often failed to meet the "predominance of common
question" requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) 2 where thousands or millions of
plaintiff class members must come forward with individualized proof of
injury. '24 Although some courts have ruled that proof of individual
damages might, if necessary, be treated in later proceedings, 5 or that
"fact of damage" might be proven on the basis of generalized injury to
the class, ' a widely accepted requirement of individual proof of damage
could well prove fatal to actions where the class consisted, for instance,
of all the citizens of a state.
The Act theoretically circumvents the burdensome and perhaps im-
possible proof of individual claims by providing that damages may be
proved and assessed in the aggregate when a price fixing violation has
been found. 27 This method, which is commonly referred to as "fluid
recovery," makes parens patriae suits more efficient than class actions
by reducing the parties' time and monetary expenditures and by sim-
plifying the court's task.'28 Due to the discretionary wording of the
relief under the class action provisions of the Federal Rules because of restrictive
judicial interpretations of the notice and manageability provisions of Rule 23....");
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 8 ("The thrust of the bill is to ... [avoid] the prob-
lems of manageability which some courts have found under Rule 23.").
1' See, e.g., Hobart Bros. Co. v. Malcolm T. Gilliland, Inc., 471 F.2d 894 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 923 (1973); South-East Coal Co. v. Consolidation Coal
Co., 434 F.2d 767 (6th Cir. 1970) cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983, reh'g denied, 404 U.S.
877 (1971).
122 See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S.
690, 700 (1962); Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 392 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 835 (1957).
12m FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
124 See, e.g., In re Hotel Telephone Charges, 500 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1974); Lohse
v. Dairy Comm'n of Nevada, 25 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1018 (C.D. Nev. 1977); Plekowski
v. Ralston Purina Co., 68 F.R.D. 443 (M.D. Ga. 1975), appeal dismissed, 557 F.2d
1218 (5th Cir. 1977).
1 See Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Wainwright v.
Kraftco Corp., 54 F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
'" See In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); In re Sugar Indus. Antitrust Litig., 1977-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 61,373, at 71,336-37 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
1- 15 U.S.C. § 15d (1976). Absent a finding of price fixing, the basic rules for
measurement of damages will apply.
1' See H.R. Rep. No. 94-499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 11976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4066.
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Act,' however, it is possible for a court to reject the fluid recovery
technique and require individualized proof of "fact of damage" and a
showing of the precise amount of damages sustained by each individual,
as required in class actions brought under section 4 of the Clayton Act.'30
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin3' was a private treble damage action in
which the Second Circuit rejected fluid recovery procedures as an un-
constitutional violation of due process of law. In re Hotel Telephone
Charges3 ' was also a private treble damage action in which the Ninth
Circuit elected to follow Eisen on the ground that treating the un-
substantiated claims of class members collectively alters substantive
rights under the antitrust laws. The court felt that such enlargement of
substantive statutory rights is prohibited by the enabling act that gives
the Supreme Court authority to promulgate the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and constitutes a denial of due process.133 The Fourth Circuit,
in Windham v. American Brands, Inc., "' has also elected to follow
Eisen's rejection of fluid recovery.
If the application of fluid recovery to parens patriae actions is
characterized as merely a procedural alternative to individual damage
assessment, it is likely that most courts will welcome the opportunity to
employ that method of damage calculation out of considerations of
judicial convenience. On the other hand, if the majority of jurisdictions
elect to view the technique as an issue of constitutional dimension, as
Eisen and its progeny perceive it, the legislature's purpose in providing
for aggregation of damages will be severely limited. 35
1" "[D]amages may be proved and assessed in the aggregate ...." 15 U.S.C.
§ 15d (1976) (emphasis added).
1"0 See 16N J. VON KALINOWSKI, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS-ANTITRUST LAWS
AND TRADE REGULATIONS § 115.05(1) (1980), for a general discussion of damages
in civil antitrust suits.
"1' 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
The court held that "[e]ven if amended Rule 23 could be read so as to permit any
such fantastic procedure [as fluid recovery], the courts would have to reject it as
an unconstitutional violation of the requirement of due process of law." 479 F.2d
at 1018.
l 500 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1974).
3 Id. at 89-90.
'" 565 F.2d 59, 72 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 968 (1978) (action for
certification of class of tobacco growers who seek to sue tobacco companies for
alleged Sherman Act violations). See also Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 573 F.2d
733, 738 (2d Cir. 1978), affd on other grounds, 440 U.S. 472 (1980) (class action
against corporation for failure to give notice of its intention to call certain con-
vertible debentures in which court rejected fluid class recovery); Pruitt v. Allied
Chem. Corp., 85 F.R.D. 100 (E.D. Va. 1980) (holding fluid recovery unacceptable,
and requiring individual proof of damage in action for certification of class seek-
ing damages for discharge of toxic effluents into interstate waterways); Al
Barnett & Son, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 64 F.R.D. 43, 55 (D. Del. 1974)
(fluid recovery award in treble damage action erodes due process).
'" From the outset, Congress perceived the ascertainment and distribution of
[Vol. 31:107
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The fluid recovery technique was proposed in In re Coordinated Pre-
trial Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 6 an action
brought under the Act. This case constituted several combined actions in
which plaintiff states sued many producers and distributors of crude oil
and refined petroleum. Plaintiff states sought monetary damages for
themselves, as consumers, and as parens patriae on behalf of all con-
sumers of petroleum products who are natural persons residing in such
states. Defendants raised constitutional objections to the proposed use
of fluid recovery. They contended that assessing damages by statistical
or sampling methods or the like, as provided by the Act, deprived defen-
dants of due process because defendants' property would be taken for
an indefinite class of people whom defendants would have no opportunity
to identify or cross-examine. Defendants also contended that because
there was little likelihood that the damages they would be required to
pay would be used to compensate for actual injuries suffered, the ex-
traction of damages from them would constitute a taking of defendants'
property for public use without just compensation.
Although the court rejected defendants' contentions, it recognized
that damage aggregation "will present some very substantial due pro-
cess problems."'3 7 The court declined to rule on this issue until the con-
text in which plaintiffs proposed to prove their case had been presented
to and was fully understood by the court.
Subsequent to this opinion, the California court, in In re Coordinated
Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation,'38
relied on Illinois Brick to dismiss all the parens patriae claims, except
those which related to direct purchases from defendants, their co-con-
spirators, sellers with whom they had cost plus contracts, or entities
which were owned or controlled by defendants. Although in this opinion
the court did not discuss the fluid recovery technique, its position as to
that issue was presumably not altered by its dismissal of parens plain-
tiffs' indirect purchaser claims.
This court was cautious about rejecting the aggregation of damages
method in a suit brought under the Act, where the Act specifically
authorized fluid recovery techniques. The court's "wait and see" ap-
proach indicates that it does not believe that the employment of fluid re-
covery necessarily constitutes an automatic constitutional infringement.
Instead, the court is willing to let the remaining plaintiffs proceed with
damages to be a major obstacle to consumer antitrust suits. Both chambers
responded with versions permitting the use of statistical or sampling techniques
in all parens patriae actions to assess damages in the aggregate. See SENATE
REPORT, supra note 11, at 156; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 2. See also 122
CONG. REC. S15,321 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1976) (Senator Abourezk's comments).
' 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,839 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
Id at 73,498.
497 F. Supp. 218 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
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damage aggregation under a presumption of constitutionality until such
time as the court has sufficient information on which to determine
whether or not defendants are being deprived of their constitutional
rights. This decision in Petroleum Products bodes well for fluid re-
covery in parens patriae actions by setting up a rebuttable presumption
that fluid recovery is constitutional and complies with the Act's damage
provisions.
2. Requirement of Superiority/Manageability
Consumer class actions brought under the antitrust laws have fre-
quently involved thousands and even millions of prospective class mem-
bers. Pertinent to whether such class actions may be maintained under
Rule 23(b)(3) are the courts' assessment of difficulties likely to be en-
countered in managing the actions. A significant source of management
difficulty is the size of the class. Size can present severe manageability
problems to antitrust class actions in two respects: 1) the feasibility of
effecting notice, as required by Rule 23(c)(2), 8 ' and 2) adjudication of
damages and apportionment of relief."0
Illustrative of such management problems is City of Philadelphia v.
American Oil Co.,' 1 a class action brought on behalf of all gasoline pur-
chasers in New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Delaware. The district court
observed:
Despite the commendable ends sought to be achieved by these
and other cases to reach millions of ultimate consumers of a
variety of products by the technique of class representation, this
Court believes that the line must be drawn somewhere in those
cases involving untold numbers of members of the general
public. The manageability requirement of Rule 23 is a significant
factor that must be given due weight in reaching a determina-
18 See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968) (for-
midable class of 3.75 million people could not be given adequate notice); Schaffner
v. Chemical Bank, 339 F. Supp. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (class action treatment denied
in action against trustee, where there were more than 5,000 trusts involved and
thousands of identifiable and unidentifiable beneficiaries because, inter alia, ade-
quate notice could not be given); United Egg Producers v. Bauer Int'l Corp., 312
F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (denying class action on behalf of all citizens of
United States who purchased eggs); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D.
589 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (impossibility of notice to class of thirty to forty million pur-
chasers of defendant's automobiles over a period of years precluded maintenance
of class action for treble damages); see notes 149-59 supra and accompanying text.
1"0 See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1972), vacated
on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (this aspect together with difficulties in giv-
ing notice resulted in the case's dismissal as unmanageable); Al Barnett & Son,
Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 64 F.R.D. 43 (D. Del. 1974); see notes 122-37 supra
and accompanying text.




tion on the propriety of class representation in any given case.
It is recognized, of course, that each case must turn on its own
facts. Numbers alone would not necessarily be determinative as
to whether a particular class should be certified. Methods of
marketing, price structures, availability of records, economic
data, and other considerations enter into the picture .... By any
reasonable standard, it is difficult for this Court to believe that
Rule 23, as presently written, was intended to reach the overly
broad non-governmental class sought to be represented by
Philadelphia-New Jersey in the pending actions. This is not to
say that guilty conspirators should not be compelled to disgorge
their ill-gotten gains. The solution of the problem, however, lies
not in imposing an increased burden on the federal courts over
and above that which may or should normally be expected of
judges in the discharge of their judicial duties, but rather in
having the antitrust laws or rules amended to alleviate the prob-
lem of manageability inherent in class actions wherein millions
of members of the consuming public are involved."2
These typical difficulties of class manageability should be immaterial
in a parens patriae action. The Act frees state attorneys general from
the Rule 23 requirement of class certification and maintenance.'
Damages may be assessed in the aggregate,'' eliminating the need for
individualized proof from millions of consumers. Moreover, notice may
be effected by publication,"5 eliminating the need for giving expensive
and time-consuming individual notice. However, as indicated elsewhere
in this Note, several courts have rejected aggregation of damages,"6 and
the Act itself provides that a court may direct such notice other than by
publication to the extent it deems necessary to meet due process re-
quirements.'
It is quite likely that a typical parens patriae action will be brought
on behalf of millions of consumers."8 In an action of that size, an order
142 Id at 73-74.
'"3 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b).
'" 15 U.S.C. § 15d (1976).
"' Id. § 15c(b)(1).
148 See notes 122-37 supra and accompanying text.
... 15 U.S.C. § 15c(b)(1) (1976).
'" See, e.g., Washington v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., No. C-77-596 (W.D. Wash.,
filed Aug. 15, 1977), reported in Washington Charges 10 Major Oil Cos. with An-
titrust Violations, [July-Dec.] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), No. 834, at
D-5 (Oct. 13, 1977). The State of Washington on behalf of its natural citizens
brought a parens patriae action charging ten major oil companies with
monopolization and restraint of trade. The complaint alleges, inter alia, that the
defendants own and control seventy-one percent of California crude oil products,
own and operate substantially all of the refining capacity in six western states,
and share ninety percent of the market for refined oil products.
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directing that individual notice be sent to each consumer, coupled with
the requirement of individualized proof of damage, will prove too un-
wieldy for the offices of most state attorneys general and will likely
sound the death knell to a suit of such magnitude.
3. Notice Requirements
Another barrier to the successful maintenance of consumer class actions
has been the notice requirement of Rule 23(c)(2). "9 It permits the court
to require notice to class members in the best method practicable, in-
cluding particularized notice to all members who can be identified
through "reasonable effort."" It is patent that particularized notice to
members of a large class is costly and burdensome.
The notice problem was highlighted in Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin.' A treble damage antitrust action was brought by an odd-lot
investor against the New York Stock Exchange and two brokerage
firms on behalf of some six million odd-lot investors, of which approx-
imately two million could be readily identified. The court held in no
uncertain terms that because Rule 23 has "decided constitutional over-
tones," individual notice must be given to each member of the class who
can be identified and the class representative must bear the cost of such
notice .152
In Utah v. Utah Gas Serv. Co., No. C79-0652 (D. Utah, filed Nov. 8, 1979),
reported in Companies Charged with Fixing Natural Gas Prices in Utah, [July-
Dec.] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 940, at D-4 (Nov. 22, 1979), the
State of Utah, on behalf of its citizen consumers, charged six major firms with
conspiracy to fix the price and terms of sale of natural gas.
In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prod. Antitrust Litig.,
1978-1 Trade Cas. 61,839 (C.D. Cal. 1978), is a multi-district litigation brought by
general states on behalf of all consumers of petroleum products that are natural
persons residing in such states.
'4 See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(2).
150 Id. The rule further provides:
The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him
from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment,
whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not request
exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclusion may, if he
desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
Id The notice requirements of Rule 23(c)(2) must be met if a class action is to be
maintainable under Rule 23(b)(3).
... 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
152 479 F.2d at 1015. The Supreme Court upheld the Second Circuit on its re-
quirement that individual notice be sent to identifiable class members. The Court
reasoned that notice was important in that each class member must be given the
opportunity to request exclusion from the action, if he so desires, and thereby
preserve his individual claim.
Although the lower court in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 564-65
(2d Cir. 1968), had concluded that the notice requirement was a matter of due pro-
cess, the Supreme Court did not specifically address that issue. The Court
[Vol. 31:107
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It is not difficult to imagine the heavy expenditures of time and
money which would be borne by a state attorney general who purported
to represent a class comprised of all consumers in the state. The Act
clearly intended to alleviate this possibility by specifically sanctioning
notice by publication.'53 Only if the court should conclude that such
notice would deny due process of law need it direct further notice.'"
The Eisen decision and its progeny'55 call into question the Act's via-
bility as it pertains to notice. If notice is perceived to be merely a pro-
cedural technicality of Rule 23(c)(2),'" then notice by publication is not a
constitutional requirement and individual notice would be directed only
where a court found that publication would deny due process. On the
other hand, if particularized notice is deemed to be a requirement of due
process,'57 then courts will be compelled to follow the Eisen approach of
requiring individual notice to "all members who can be identified
observed:
Petitioner further contends that adequate representation, rather than
notice, is the touchstone of due process in a class action and therefore
satisfies Rule 23. We think this view has little to commend it. To begin
with, Rule 23 speaks to notice as well as to adequacy of representation
and requires that both be provided. Moreover, petitioner's argument
proves too much for it quickly leads to the conclusion that no notice at
all, published or otherwise, would be required in the present case. This
cannot be so, for quite apart from what due process may require, the
command of Rule 23 is clearly to the contrary. We therefore conclude
that Rule 23(c)(2) requires that individual notice be sent to all class
members who can be identified with reasonable effort.
417 U.S. 156, 176-77 (1974) (emphasis added). But see Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (mandatory notice pursuant to Rule 23(c)(2)
designed to fulfill due process requirements).
" 15 U.S.C. § 15c(b)(1) (1976).
15 U.S.C. § 15c(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
" See, e.g., Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 412 (2d Cir.
1975); Schrader v. Selective Service System Local Board No. 76, 470 F.2d 73, 75
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1085 (1972); J.W.T., Inc. v. Joseph E. Seagram &
Sons, Inc., 63 F.R.D. 139, 142 n.7 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Malby v. General Electric Credit
Corp., 61 F.R.D. 59, 61 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
" There is considerable authority for the position that prejudgment notice to
absent class members is not required in actions certified under sections of the
rule other than 23(b)(3). See, e.g., Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 756
(3d Cir.); cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974) (Rules 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2)); Yaffe v.
Powers, 454 F.2d 1362, 1366 (1st Cir. 1972) (Rule 23(b)(2)); Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969) (Rule 23(b)(2) (by im-
plication)), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
See also 3B J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.55 (1978) (Rules 23(b)(1)
and 23(b)(2)); 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE:
CIVIL § 1786 (1972) (Rules 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2)).
' See FED. R. CIV. P. 23, ADVISORY COMM. NOTE, which indicates that the Ad-
visory Committee thought that due process required prejudgment notice in Rule
23(b)(3) cases.
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through reasonable effort," '158 regardless of the absence of due process
overtones.
As yet, courts have not been required to address prejudgment notice
under the Act.159 It is clear, however, that if it is determined that due
process mandates individualized notice wherever practicable, state at-
torneys general will be severely handicapped with respect to staff hours
as well as financial outlays, which may possibly exceed their allowable
resources. Furthermore, the total recovery in a successful parens
patriae suit may be far outweighed by the cost of bringing the action."'
C. Miscellaneous Enforcement Problems
1. Funding
Pursuant to the passage of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improve-
ments Act of 1976, the 94th Congress authorized a thirty million dollar
seed money program, which was distributed to forty-six states.16 The
funding was applied to state antitrust enforcement programs and
resulted in the doubling of state enforcement efforts."2 However, the
funding dried up for some states in 1981;' as early as mid-1980 funding
cutbacks had already jeopardized the existence of antitrust enforcement
programs in seventeen states."6 '
158 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). The requirement that "reasonable effort" be used
to identify class members raises additional threshold obstacles for state at-
torneys general. "Reasonable effort" may encompass individual notice, publica-
tion in newspapers or a combination of both. See, e.g., Cohen v. District of Colum-
bia Nat'l Bank, 59 F.R.D. 84 (D.C. 1972).
159 The case of Colorado v. Valley Petroleum Co., Civ. No. 77-W-352 (D. Colo.,
filed Apr. 12, 1977), was a parens patriae action against seven oil companies for
price fixing. When the case was settled, Colorado's attorney general ordered that
consumers who might be eligible to receive a portion of the $140,404 settlement
be notified by direct mailings, statewide radio, television, newspaper messages
and courthouse and post office postings. See Colorado Files Proposed Notice to
Consumers Affected by Settlement of Parens Patriae Action, [July-Dec.] ANTI-
TRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 835, at D-2 (Oct. 2, 1977).
"6 As the court observed in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d at 1010,
the first round of notices becomes relatively unimportant if the concept of fluid
recovery is employed, thereby substituting the "class as a whole" for individual
claimants. For an analysis of the problems in applying fluid recovery in parens
patriae actions see notes 122-39 supra and accompanying text.
161 State Enforcement "Oaks" Grow From "Acorns" Planted by Congress,
[Jan.-June] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 909, at D-1 (Apr. 12, 1979)
[hereinafter cited as State Enforcement]. Wyoming, Oklahoma, Indiana and
Georgia refused the funds. The grants were made largely on a population formula
and ranged in size from $130,000 to $412,500.
162 Id
16 Id. at D-3.
'" Endangered programs were those in Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado,
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The Act provides that the court shall award the prevailing state treb-
le damages plus the cost of the suit, including "a reasonable attorney's
fee."' 6 Payment of attorneys' fees alone could provide sufficient funding
to maintain the state attorney's parens patriae program. However,
many state attorneys have indicated their reluctance to file parens
patriae actions because of the perceived impact of Illinois Brick.'
At least a dozen states have established "revolving funds" in an effort
to ensure future funding and to achieve self-sufficiency." 7 When these
states have recovered funds through successful parens patriae damage
suits, a portion of the award is invested in the revolving fund, which is
then the primary source of the antitrust unit's future budget." 8
However, federal cutbacks and an atmosphere of growing public disil-
lusionment with antitrust enforcement. 9 may cause a decline in state
enforcement efforts. Moreover, state legislatures seem reluctant to pro-
vide future funding for such programs when federal monies run out.70
If additional funding is not forthcoming, the future of parens patriae
actions grows dimmer. It is unlikely that a state attorney general would
consider bringing a parens patriae action on behalf of his injured
citizens in view of high enforcement costs in general, coupled with the
possible additional obstacle of meeting judicial opposition based on Il-
linois Brick,'7' judicial refusal to permit fluid recovery techniques'72 and
particularized notice requirements.'
Although many state antitrust programs are years away from
reaching self-sufficiency, the general outlook indicates that many more
programs are now self-sustaining and generally favorable for the con-
sumer.'74 If the state antitrust enforcement officers can demonstrate to
the legislatures the need for continued antitrust enforcement, the fund-
ing may be provided.'7' If such a showing cannot be made, however,
needed funding will be withheld, and parens patriae may well be strip-
Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire,
North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont and West
Virginia. See Hope Dims for Further Federal Funding of State Antitrust En-
forcement Programs, [Jan.-June] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 967,
at D-6 (June 5, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Federal Funding].
" 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
'm State Enforcement, supra note 160, at D-3.
167 Id.
166 Id.
169 Federal Funding, supra note 164, at D-7.
Id. at D-6.
'7' See notes 74-119 supra and accompanying text.
' See notes 122-38 supra and accompanying text.
'7' See notes 149-59 supra and accompanying text.
171 State Enforcers Examine Methods to Get More Impact From Funding,
[July-Dec.] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 979, at D-5 (Aug. 8, 1980).
175 Id.
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ped of vitality and become just another archaic piece of legislation that
simply did not work.
2. Award of Attorneys' Fees to Defendants
The Act provides that a court may, in its discretion, award attorneys'
fees to prevailing defendants who can show that a state attorney
general acted in "bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive
reasons." '176 This represents a departure from antitrust tradition in that
a successful defendant cannot, as a rule, recover attorney fees and costs,
even if the suit against him is found to be without merit.1"
In parens patriae as well as private actions, the punitive nature of
treble damages serves the dual purpose of deterring potential antitrust
violators while providing plaintiffs with an incentive to institute the ac-
tion."8 This disincentive of attorney fee awards to defendants might
give state attorneys general cause to consider the wisdom of instituting
a parens patriae action unless preliminary proof against a defendant
constitutes a prima facie case. As a general rule, however, it is
reasonable to assume that the already limited resources of a state at-
torney general would preclude him from bringing any action unless he
had reasonable expectations of ultimate victory, while, as a practical
matter, a successful defendant would be hard pressed to show "bad
faith." It is likely that this provision of the Act will have a negligible im-
pact on the future of parens patriae damage actions. 79
IV. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES
It would be unduly optimistic to conclude that parens patriae damage
,76 15 U.S.C. § 15c(d)(2) (1976).
177 See Bryam Concretanks, Inc. v. Warren Concrete Prod. Co. of N.J., 374 F.2d
649 (3d Cir. 1967). After dismissal of a private treble damage action the District
Court for the District of New Jersey awarded defendants attorneys' fees and
costs on the grounds that the suit was baseless. In reversing the decision, the
Third Circuit held that in the absence of specific legislative authorization, at-
torneys' fees could not be awarded to defendants in private antitrust litigation.
Id. at 651.
17 Id.
179 As one state attorney general remarked:
Some members of the bar and of the press, no doubt through ignorance
or even antagonism, might conclude that the reason for the institution of
... [only four parens patriae cases in the eight month period after the
Act was passed] was the inclusion of the provisions of Section 4C(d)(2) of
the Clayton Act .... Even in your wildest imaginations can you possibly
conceive of a state attorney general acting in bad faith, vexatiously,
wantonly, or for oppressive reasons...? [That possibility is] as likely as
the business roundtable petitioning the Supreme Court for a rehearing in
Illinois Brick as a friend of the court.
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actions are here to stay. A plethora of obstacles, when confronted either
individually or cumulatively, stand to defeat the legislative purpose of
providing redress for consumers injured by antitrust violations.
A formidable barrier to the future of parens patriae actions is the Illi-
nois Brick holding.'" Congressional efforts to overrule that decision
have been unsuccessful and there is no indication that the Supreme
Court, itself, will overrule the decision in the foreseeable future. Thus,
Illinois Brick's direct purchaser rule must somehow be reconciled with
parens patriae consumer actions if the Act is to become the viable anti-
trust enforcement tool which Congress intended.
The recent case of In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litigation8 '
applies Illinois Brick rational to its holding but at least admits that
there may be additional exceptions to the rule where plaintiffs can show
that market forces have been superseded. Unfortunately, the court left
the explanation of what is meant by the suspension of market forces, as
well as the delineation of additional exceptions which might result from
such suspension, to future decisions. The most recent Petroleum Pro-
ducts 8' decision automatically applies Illinois Brick to bar all suits by in-
direct purchasers which do not fall within one of three narrow excep-
tions. The court in Vermont v. Densmore Brick Co.,' would also bar in-
direct purchasers from recovery on Illinois Brick grounds.
One of the primary, and perhaps most understandable, concerns of
the Illinois Brick majority was the spectre of double recovery to defend-
ants. This problem is an insignificant one in parens patriae actions,
where the Act has built-in mechanisms to preclude double recovery.
Further, courts and state attorneys general could fashion additional pro-
cedures which would limit, if not entirely eliminate the risk. Existing
discovery methods would permit a state attorney general to reasonably
identify all direct purchasers of the product. The state attorney or the
district court could then easily and at negligible expense notify the
direct purchasers of the pending parens patriae action to determine the
amount of injury they sustained, if any, and whether they intend to seek
redress. The district court would then be in a position to exclude, as
prescribed by the Act, 84 the amount of injury suffered by direct pur-
chasers from the damages awarded to parens patriae claimants. If the
direct purchasers were themselves co-conspirators, they should be join-
ed as defendants and precluded from recovering against their suppliers
through the doctrine of in pari delicto. Likewise, if the direct pur-
chasers were owned or controlled by their suppliers, they should be
"' See notes 74-119 supra and accompanying text.
"' 516 F. Supp. 1287 (D. Md. 1981).
182 497 F. Supp. 218 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
"= 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,347 (D. Vt. 1980), see generally notes 96-98
supra and accompanying text.
'" 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(1) (1976).
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named as defendants. The short, four-year statute of limitations,' 5 in
light of the extended nature of antitrust actions, makes it unlikely that
additional private treble damage actions will be filed after a final judg-
ment is rendered in a parens patriae suit.
Before the Act was passed, the Senate believed that the danger of
double recovery in parens patriae was minimal in light of the district
court's control over its decrees.' It contemplated the use of such pro-
cedural devices as statutory interpleader by antitrust defendants, the
appointment of special masters to handle complex cases, compulsory
joinder and doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel to minimize
or eliminate double recoveries.
Any one or more of these procedures should be freely employed by a
district court in parens patriae suits where the possibility of double re-
covery exists. These devices will largely eliminate the risk of multiple li-
ability from suits brought on behalf of indirect purchaser-consumers. In
any event, long-standing policy considerations underlying antitrust en-
forcement, and particularly the Parens Patriae Act, should compel a
court to impose liability where the choice is between awarding indirect
purchasers duplicative recoveries or permitting antitrust violators to
retain the fruits of their illegality.
The most significant hurdles faced by consumers in antitrust class
actions which are most likely to be transferred to parens patriae are: 1)
the requirement of common questions of law or fact as applied to proof
of damages, and 2) the individual notice provisions. The Act sought to
remove these impediments by substituting fluid recovery techniques in
place of individualized proof of damages,'87 and by providing for notice
by publication in place of the onerous requirement of particularized
notice. Each of these provisions has met with some judicial resistance.
Fluid recovery has been rejected as an unconstitutional denial of due
process by at least three circuits in private treble damage class
5 Id § 15b.
'" See SENATE REPORT, supra note 11, at 44. In his dissenting opinion to Illi-
nois Brick Co. v. Illinois, Justice Brennan points out that the possibility of multi-
ple recovery exists in only two situations: "(1) where suits by direct and indirect
purchasers are pending at the same time but in different courts; and (2) where ad-
ditional suits are filed after an award of damages based on the same violation in a
prior suit." 431 U.S. at 762 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
In the first situation, Justice Brennan suggested that district courts use the
intradistrict transfer power provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1404(b); coordinate pretrial
proceedings of cases filed in other districts, or transfer cases to a single district
as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); or facilitate transfers by the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 where such transfer will
promote efficiency and the convenience of the parties. Id. at 762-63.
As to the second situation, Justice Brennan believed that the four-year statute
of limitations would make it "impractical for potential plaintiffs to sit on their
rights until after entry of judgment in the earlier suit." Id at 764.
-' 15 U.S.C. § 15d (1976).
[Vol. 31:107
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actions.' 8 However, the court in Petroleum Products8 " refused to dis-
allow the use of fluid recovery until such time as substantial due process
violations were shown. Although Petroleum Products,' when favorably
construed, may indicate that courts will be inclined to permit fluid re-
covery in parens patriae actions where it is specifically authorized by
the Act, the decision nevertheless represents only one interlocutory
opinion, which is less than decisive, from one circuit.
The constitutional dimensions identified with fluid recovery are prob-
lematic to the future of parens patriae. If the technique were rejected
on purely procedural grounds, the provisions of the Act would clearly
override such objections. If, however, fluid recovery is found to be a per
se deprivation of the antitrust defendants' constitutional rights, then
each parens patriae consumer will be required to prove his individual
damages-a formidable, if not impossible, task where millions of con-
sumers are represented in a typical parens patriae damage action. To
hold that fluid recovery is unconstitutional in all circumstances would,
in effect, be the equivalent of finding the Act unconstitutional.
A more reasoned approach, however, was taken by the court in the
first Petroleum Products9 ' opinion, a case in which fluid recovery was
proposed. Although the court did not ignore the possible due process
implications of the procedure, it chose to permit plaintiffs to proceed
with their case. Only when all relevant facts were considered, together
with the context in which the case arose, would that court rule on
whether or not to permit fluid recovery.12
While the Petroleum Products approach does not fully resolve the
due process challenge to fluid recovery, it does give a state attorney
general the opportunity to present his case with a proposed method of
proving damages to the court during the pretrial stage of the litigation.
When the court is familiar with the facts, it will be in a better position
to intelligently weigh the pros and cons of fluid recovery. This approach
is certainly preferable to one which would find a key section of the Act
unconstitutional.
Closely related in theory to the operation of proof of damage is the
problem of particularized notice. 93 Although the Act recommends that
notice be given by publication,"'4 at least two circuits have ordered that
,8' See notes 131-34 supra and accompanying text.
"8 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,839 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
191 Id
... Id. It should be noted, however, that the most recent decision in that case
dismissed plaintiffs as indirect purchasers, whose claims did not come within any
of the stated exceptions to Illinois Brick. The fluid recovery method, if it can be
applied to any of the remaining claims, has not been precluded by the court. See
notes 127-38 supra and accompanying text.
193 See notes 149-59 supra and accompanying text.
,' 15 U.S.C. § 15c(b)(1) (1976).
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individual notice be given to each class member who can be identified,
with the class representative bearing the cost of such notice. '95 These
courts, like those which rejected fluid recovery, based their decision on
constitutional grounds. In the context of parens patriae, the res judicata
effect of a judgment would preclude any citizen who failed to exclude
himself from the action (perhaps because he never received notice) from
bringing a subsequent private action. '96 It is not unseemly to relate lack
of notice in such a situation to a deprivation of due process.
Nevertheless, individual notice to all consumers of a state is an
economically impossible task for a state attorney general. Such a re-
quirement, particularly when coupled with individualized proof of
damage, could ultimately foreclose the majority of state attorneys
general from bringing parens patriae damage actions.
As a practical matter, however, the typical parens patriae action was
intended to be brought on behalf of consumers with small individual
claims who would be unlikely to prosecute a private treble damage ac-
tion. "'97 Whether or not such a consumer would be precluded from bring-
ing a subsequent private action by the res judicata effect of a parens
patriae judgment is probably of little consequence to him. Although he
might suffer a technical denial of procedural due process through notice
by publication, it is unlikely that his substantive due process rights
would be infringed. The cases in which notice by publication was held to
be a constitutional deprivation involved class members who each had
potentially major damage claims. These cases are readily dis-
tinguishable from the typical parens patriae action in terms of the in-
dividual amount of damages at stake. There is little to be lost by a
typical consumer who is bound by a judgment rendered in a parens
patriae action. Shortly after a parens patriae action is filed, the district
court should realistically assess the amount of a representative in-
dividual claim by determining the dollar amount which constitutes the
illegal overcharge on a product and, if possible, estimate the frequency
with which the typical consumer would have incurred the overcharge.
Only where the overcharge on each product is substantial should a court
consider the due process implications of notice by publication, as is con-
templated by the Act. 99
Should the aforementioned issues be successfully resolved, the prob-
lem of funding will continue, nonetheless, to burden many state at-
torneys general and will be exacerbated if additional dollars are not
forthcoming from federal and state legislatures. The Act provides that
reasonable attorney fees shall be awarded to the successful attorney
general. As is generally the case in antitrust litigation, it is likely that
"g 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973); see also note 152 supra and accompanying text.
15 U.S.C. § 15c(b)(3) (1976).
197 See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
15 U.S.C. § 15(b)(1) (1976).
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these fees would be sizeable enough to totally fund the state's program.
However, Illinois Brick has deterred many state attorneys general from
bringing parens patriae damage actions on behalf of indirect purchasers.
Because these actions would probably involve the greatest potential
recoveries and the largest number of plaintiffs, they would likely bring
in the greatest amount of attorney fees. Failure to bring such actions
and ultimately prevail in them prevents states from acquiring lucrative
fees which could be so large as to fund totally the state's program.
Perhaps the most feasible solution yet proposed is the "revolving fund,"
currently in effect in several states.99 When a state recovers a parens
patriae award, it should set part of it aside in a fund reserved for financ-
ing subsequent parens patriae actions. A well-managed revolving fund
will permit a state attorney general's office to eventually attain self-
sufficiency and the amount retained from the damage award will ulti-
mately benefit the state's consumers, the intended beneficiaries of the
state's action.
V. CONCLUSION
Numerous potential difficulties beset the future of parens patriae.
The Act faces procedural as well as constitutional attacks from potential
antitrust defendants and courts alike. Whether or not it will survive
these challenges in its present form is mere conjecture. Yet, it is certain
that the powerful policy considerations underlying the Act are no less
compelling today than they were when the Act was passed. Perhaps the
full potential of the Act will be realized only if the Act, itself, is scrap-
ped and restructured.
One intriguing possibility is to model the Act on the plaintiffs' theory
in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of California,"' where plaintiff state, as
parens patriae, sought damages for any injury to its general economy
attributable to a violation of the antitrust laws."' The Supreme Court
1 See notes 165-67 supra and accompanying text.
405 U.S. 251 (1972). But see note 39 supra and accompanying text.
' The state's parens patriae claim was stated in the following manner:
19. The State of Hawaii, acting through its Attorney General,
brings this action by virtue of its duty to protect the general welfare of
the State and its citizens, acting herein as parens patriae, trustee,
guardian and representative of its citizens, to recover damages for, and
secure injunctive relief against, the violations of the antitrust laws
hereinbefore alleged.
20. The unlawful contracts, combination and conspiracy in restraint
of trade, unlawful combination and conspiracy to monopolize and monop-
olization, hereinbefore alleged, have injured and adversely affected the
economy and prosperity of the state of Hawaii in, among others, the
following ways:(a) revenues of its citizens have been wrongfully extracted from the
State of Hawaii;
(b) taxes affecting the citizens and commercial entities have been in-
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denied recovery solely on the ground that an injury to a state's general
economy is not compensable under the antitrust laws. The Court obser-
ved that if Congress had intended to provide such a remedy, it could
have done so.2 °2
Where the property of a state's citizens is diminished by an antitrust
violation, there is harm to the economic wealth of the state. In seeking
to preserve the economic opportunities of its people, a state, under the
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of California theory, would sue for damages
to its economy resulting from antitrust violations and retain the damage
award in its general coffers, where the monies would be expended for
the benefit of all citizens in that state. In fact, the Act in its present
form permits the court to characterize the damage award as a "civil
penalty" to be deposited with the state as general revenues."3 This ap-
proach would, in theory, eliminate the difficulties besetting current
parens patriae actions and, at the same time, retain the benefits of
redress to consumers and deterrence to antitrust violators con-
templated by the Act. Specifically, the Illinois Brick rule would be ir-
relevant to such an action. Instead of the state claiming injury to in-
direct purchasers who might be barred under the rule, the state would
claim injury to its economy in the form of, for example, impairment of
its tourism industry, growth, industry or development resulting from
defendants' antitrust violations. Assessment of actual damages would
present no greater problems than those routinely encountered in an-
titrust suits. As Justice Douglas stated in his Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.
of California dissent, "[e]conomists have developed models for measur-
ing the effects upon local economies from infusions or extractions of
given sums of money from those economies. In short, a state's economy
is susceptible of articulation and measurement."" 4 The state's interest
creased to affect such losses of revenues and income;
(c) opportunity in manufacturing, shipping and commerce have [sic]
been restricted and curtailed;
(d) the full and complete utilization of the natural wealth of the
State has been prevented;
(e) the high cost of manufacture in Hawaii has precluded goods made
there from equal competitive access with those of other States to the
national market;
(f) measures taken by the State to promote the general progress and
welfare of its people have been frustrated;
(g) the Hawaii economy has been held in a state of arrested develop-
ment.
21. Plaintiff has not yet ascertained the precise extent of said
damage to itself and its citizens; however, when said amount has been
ascertained, plaintiff will ask leave of Court to insert said sum herein.
405 U.S. at 255-56 (opinion of the Court, quoting from the State's Complaint).
Id. at 262.
15 U.S.C. § 15e(2) (1976).
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in its economy is arguably within its "business or property" interests.
The damages recovered by the state would be used to recompense the
collective community. Damage actions by individuals for the same viola-
tions would be precluded unless potential individual plaintiffs could
show special or different injury from that suffered by the community.
This approach would minimize the risks of duplicative recovery.
Complications could, of course, arise under this approach. Never-
theless, it is one worth considering, particularly if the only alternative is
the demise of parens patriae consumer actions for antitrust violations.
This very real possibility, while admittedly pessimistic at this point in
the Act's existence, could become a reality in the not so distant future
unless the barriers are lifted or the Act is restructured.
PATRICIA J. O'DONNELL-GAYNOR
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